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The constitutionalist reconstruction of 
international law: Pros and cons 
 
You are invited to look at international law through constitutionalist 
spectacles. Such a constitutionalist reading of current international law is to 
some extent an academic artefact. It has a creative moment, simply because 
it lays emphasis on certain characteristics of international law. But such an 
intellectual construct is nothing unusual in legal practice. If we accept the 
hermeneutic premise that a naked meaning of a text, independent of the 
reader, does not exist, then the reconstruction of some portions of 
international law as international constitutional law is just an ordinary 
hermeneutic exercise. It is no distortion of norms which are ‘objectively’ 
something else, but a legitimate form of interpretation. 
 
1. Concepts  
Writing in 1758, Emer de Vattel explained: ‘[L]e règlement fondamental qui 
détermine la manière dont l’Autorité Publique doit être exercée est ce qui 
forme la Constitution de l’Etat.’ 1  Extrapolating this concept to the 
international political process, I use the term ‘global (or international) 
constitutional law’ to designate the bulk of the most important norms which 
regulate the political activity and relationships in the global polity. Global 
constitutional law is a sub-set of international rules and principles which are 
so important that they deserve the label ‘constitution’.2  
Typically, State constitutions (roughly) set in place political institutions and 
define their competences, lay down the terms of membership (who is subject 
to the constitution?), the relations between the members and the community, 
and (again roughly) regulate the institution’s core functions of law-making, 
conflict resolution and law enforcement.3 In the international legal order, we 
do find rules and principles which deal with exactly these questions, albeit 
often in a rudimentary form. These rules may be viewed as international 
constitutional law. 
                                                        
1 E de Vattel, Le droit des gens ou principes de la loi naturelle appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires 
de Nations et des Souverains (London, 1758, repr. Carnegie Institution, Washington, 1916), livre I, chap. 
III, § 27 (at 31). 
2  Whether these norms (rules and principles) of potential constitutional quality are superior 
to ordinary international norms, whether they are codified in one or several documents, whether 
they are created by states or by other actors as well, whether they are always ‘hard’ legal norms, 
whether they embody a specific set of material principles, and whether they are ‘constitutional’ only 
to the extent that they are enforceable by some form of judicial review, remains to be seen. 
3  Cf. G Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Berlin, Otto Häring, 1914) at 505: ‘Die Verfassung des 
Staates umfaßt demnach in der Regel die Rechtssätze, welche die obersten Organe des Staates 
bezeichnen, die Art ihrer Schöpfung, ihr gegenseitiges Verhältnis und ihren Wirkungskreis 
festsetzen, ferner die grundsätzliche Stellung des einzelnen zur Staatsgewalt.’ 
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‘Constitutionalization’ is a shorthand term for the emergence of constitutional 
law within a given legal order. The concept of constitutionalization implies 
that a constitution (or constitutional law) can come into being in a process 
extended through time. It also implies that a legal text (or various legal texts) 
can acquire (or eventually lose) constitutional properties in a positive feed-
back process. A text can therefore be more (or less) constitution-like. It may 
be, in short, a constitution-in-the-making. In consequence, ‘global (or 
international) constitutionalization’ is a catchword for the continuing process 
of the emergence, creation and identification of constitution-like elements in 
the international legal order. 
Another important term in this context is ‘constitutionalism’.4 Historically, 
constitutionalism was the 17th/18th century political movement in quest for 
a written constitution (of a nation state). The basic purpose of the 
constitution was to make political power (the monarchy) subject to the law, 
hence to create a government of laws, not of men. In order to reach that 
objective, the constitution was to embody certain material principles, most 
importantly the separation of powers/checks and balances. It is important to 
realize that the concept of ‘constitutionalism’ is more than the term 
‘constitution’ (which is in that respect more ambiguous) loaded with 
material contents: ‘Constitutionalism does not refer simply to having a 
constitution, but to having a particular kind of constitution, however 
difficult it may be to specify its contents’.5 Constitutionalism asks for a good 
(legitimate) constitution.  
I consequently employ the term ‘global constitutionalism’ in order to 
characterize a strand of thought and a political agenda which advocates the 
application of constitutional principles, such as the rule of law, checks and 
balances, human rights protection, and possibly also democracy, in the 
international legal sphere in order to improve the effectiveness and the 
fairness of the international legal order. 
                                                        
4  O Beaud, ‘Constitution et constitutionnalisme’ in P Raynaud and S Rials (eds), Dictionnaire 
de philosophie politique (Paris, Quadriga/PUF, 2003) at 133-142; G Casper, ‘Constitutionalism’ in LW 
Levy and others (eds), Encyclopedia of the American Constitution Vol. 2 (New York/London, Macmilan, 
1986) at 473-480; UK Preuss, ‘Constitutionalism’ in E Craig (ed), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
Vol. 2 (London, Routledge, 1998) at 618-622; Red., ‘Konstitutionalismus’ in J Ritter (ed), Historisches 
Wörterbuch der Philosophie Vol. 4 (Basel, Schwabe, 1989) at 1005-1006.  
5 Casper (n 4) at 747. JH Weiler and M Wind have correctly pointed out ‘that there is a 
difference between constitution and constitutionalism. Constitutionalism ... embodies the values, 
often non-stated, which underlie the material and institutional provisions in a specific constitution. 
At this level, separating constitution from constitutionalism would allow us to claim, rightly or 
wrongly, for example, that the Italian and German constitutions, whilst very different in their 
material and institutional provisions, share a similar constitutionalism vindicating certain neo-
Kantian humanistic values, combined with the notion of the Rechtsstaat’ (JH Weiler and M Wind, 
‘Introduction’, in idem (eds), European Constitutionalism beyond the State (Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 
2003) 1 at 3). See extensively on the ‘divorce’ of constitution and constitutionalism Beaud (n 4) at 136-
142.  
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2. Objections against the constitutionalist reading of international 
law  
A host of objections against the constitutionalist reading have been raised. 
They relate both to the legal soundness of the reconstruction, and to its 
arguably negative policy effects. 
Lack of constitutional mythology? 
One criticism is that international law lacks the ‘symbolic-esthetical 
dimension’ which is inherent within national (constitutional) law. 6 
According to this perspective, constitutions have the prime function of 
storing the meaning of a political community. They embody revolutionary 
ideas not in an abstract fashion, but by (physical) sacrifice. Consequently, a 
constitution is genuinely ‘owned’ by a people mainly because its meaning is 
transported by the sacrifice made for it.7 But because all this is lacking on the 
international plane, the idea of international constitutional law is – so the 
argument goes – a sham.  
However, this criticism appears to suffer from a gender-bias, and risks 
overstating the importance of irrational and mythological foundations of 
constitutional law. For example, the German constitution enjoys a high 
reputation among German citizens, although nobody has been sacrificed for 
it in a physical sense in a war or a revolution.  
Over-expectations?  
A second objection is that the constitutionalist reading raises dangerously 
seductive ‘over-expectations’.8 The term ‘constitution’ might be a misnomer 
when applied to the international sphere.9 Therefore says the critique, the 
very terms on which the constitutionalization debate takes place, is 
erroneous. The vocabulary makes it virtually impossible to escape from the 
assumptions that go with it. And ‘social legitimacy is being artificially 
constructed through the use of constitutional language’. 10  So the 
constitutionalist reconstruction might fraudulently create the illusion of 
legitimacy of global governance. Constitutionalist language – in the eyes of 
the critique – abuses the highly value-laden term ‘constitutionalism’ in order 
                                                        
6 U Haltern, ‘Internationales Verfassungsrecht’ (2003) 128 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 511-
556. 
7 Idem at 533-34, drawing on B Anderson, Imagined Communities (London, Verso, 1983).  
8  R MacDonald and DM Johnston, ‘Introduction’ in idem (eds), Towards World 
Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Commmunity (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2005, 
xiii, at xvii). 
9 Cf. DZ Cass, Constitutionalization of the WTO (Oxford, Oxford UP, 2005) at 208 relating to 
the WTO. 
10 Cf. Cass (n 9) at 237 (on the WTO). 
4 THE CONSTITUTIONALIST RECONSTRUCTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROS AND CONS 
to reap profit from its positive connotations and to dignify the international 
legal order through it.  
However, the danger that constitutionalism is misunderstood ‘as a 
mechanism that can instantly bestow legitimacy’11 does not seem very real. 
International and constitutional lawyers are discerning enough to realize 
that ‘constitutionalism’ is not a ready-made answer, but – on the contrary – a 
perspective which might help the right questions of fairness, justice, and 
effectiveness to be asked.  
Unrealist?  
Another important objection is raised by legal realists. The constitutionalist 
paradigm became popular after the final demise of the socialist bloc, in a 
period marked by an ‘excès d’optimisme contre lequel le juriste n’est pas 
toujours immunisé’.12 Realists point out that international law must content 
itself with a more or less ‘symbolic constitutionalization’, 13  or that any 
international constitutional is in any case a ‘nominalist’ one in the sense of 
Karl Loewenstein.14 
The gist of this critique is that the constitutionalist reading of international 
law is not grounded in and backed by a real common political will and 
corresponding power structures and sanctions at the international level, 
which would allow the international constitution to be enforced. The 
constitutionalist reading, so the argument goes, is too idealist, and does not 
adequately reflect the realist calculus of governments. In the event of a 
problem or conflict, any constitutionalist attitude will be given up, says the 
critique.15 For instance, (Western) governments do not advocate universal 
protection of human rights because they believe that it is a good thing, but 
because they are exposed to internal pressures by their constituencies to 
observe human rights standards, and they simply want to prevent other 
states’ competitive advantages by not being themselves restricted by human-
rights concerns. Likewise, the UN and other international organizations are, 
for most member states, only a means of realizing their national interests.16 
To sum up: In the absence of compliance and universal acceptance, the idea 
of international constitutional law may simply be an academic pipe dream.17  
                                                        
11 J Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism Lite’ (2004) 1 International Organizations Law Review 31 at 48.  
12 S Szurek, ‘La Charte des Nations Unies Constitution Mondiale?’ in J-P Cot and others, La 
Charte des Nations Unies: commentaire article par article Vol 1 (3rd edn, Paris, Economica, 2005) 29 at 32. 
13 M Neves, Symbolische Konstitutionalisierung (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1998).  
14 K Loewenstein, Verfassungslehre (Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr, 1959) at 152-53. 
15 W Kälin, ‘Der Menschenrechtsschutz der UNO: Ein Beispiel für die Konstitutionalisierung 
des Völkerrechts?’ in W Kälin and T Cottier (eds), Die Öffnung des Verfassungsrechts: Symposium zum 
65. Geburtstag von Prof. Jörg Paul Müller (2005) recht Sonderheft 42 at 47. 
16 Idem at 49. 
17 F Müller, Demokratie zwischen Staatsrecht und Weltrecht (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2003) 
at 132. 
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This objection is very pertinent, but I will try to reply. First, academic 
reconstructions do not depend on moral attitudes which governments do or 
do not share. A good idea does not become bad if some stupid politicians do 
not accept it. However, law and legal constructs and arguments are 
supposed to have an impact on the exercise of power. This is what law is 
about. Indeed, international constitutionalism has both descriptive and 
prescriptive elements. It does not merely claim to describe some features of 
the status quo of international relations, but seeks to provide arguments for 
their further development in a specific direction.18  
Because, in an epoch of interdependence, national and ‘public international 
interests’ tend to converge more and more, national interests and universal 
idealism are not necessarily in opposition. Therefore global 
constitutionalism may even, at least in the long run, further national 
economic and political interests, although some states benefit more than 
others.  
End of politics?  
This leads to another objection which asserts that constitutionalism is too 
apolitical, and is an unrealistic ‘promise of the end of politics’.19 A related 
strand of criticism insinuates that an important function of the constitutional 
concept is to symbolise a simplified, compact order in a world that, in reality, 
is complex and amorphous. In this perspective, the myth of the unity of the 
constitution has to be rejected: instead a spontaneous self-coordination of 
interests must be chosen as starting point, legally anchored in individual 
liberties (human rights) and the cognitive ‘social capital’ anchored within it. 
‘The constitutional concept then remains an (imaginary) reference point for a 
nation-state like past …’20  
However, the term ‘constitution’ has never been exclusively reserved for 
state constitutions. Today, the notional link between constitution and state 
has further been loosened in everyday language and in the legal discourse 
(and thereby the meaning of ‘constitution’ may have been broadened). It is 
therefore not per definitionem impossible to conceptualize constitutional law 
beyond the nation or the state. Global constitutionalism advocates non-state 
constitutional law, and tends to de-mystify the state and the state 
constitution.  
With regard to the concern that the constitutional approach is too apolitical, 
it must be pointed out that law and politics should not be viewed as distinct 
                                                        
18 Cf. Szurek (n 12) at 32: ‘En parlant de “constitution mondiale”, peut-être cherche-t-on 
aujourd’hui davantage à conjurer des perils préssentis sinon toujours identifiés, qu’à saluer un état 
de fait réalisé.’ 
19 Klabbers (n 11) at 47.  
20 T Vesting, ‘Constitutionalism or Legal Theory: Comments on Gunther Teubner’ in C 
Joerges and others (eds), Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Oxford and Portland Oregon, 
Hart, 2004) 29 at 35. 
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realms, but rather as structurally coupled systems.21 Law is the product of 
political activity which has been fixed in order to organize and limit political 
action. In particular, constitutional law has traditionally been characterized 
as a branch of law which is very close to politics. In consequence, 
constitutionalism can be conceived as a political, not an apolitical, project 
(although it does suggest that there is a sphere ‘above’ everyday politics). 
Preventing revolution? 
Another objection is that global constitutionalism is a palliative which serves 
to obscure the elitist and aristocratic structure of international society and 
prevents ‘revolutionary social change’.22  
This objection is a reminder of the classic socialist-marxist critique of any 
type of liberal reform strategy. Without entering into this long-standing 
debate, it is readily admitted here that the constitutionalist approach indeed 
implies that (international) law should be used as an instrument of 
evolutionary, not revolutionary, change. The basic premise of this approach 
is that gradual reforms are generally preferable to revolutionary ruptures in 
the course of which individual rights of the living risk being discarded for 
the promise of a better future for coming generations. 
Constitutional imperialism?  
A sixth and probably crucial concern is that the concept of international 
constitutionalism suffers from oversell and vagueness. General international 
law, politics, law and economics are being mixed, if not confused, and 
‘things formerly called institutional are being legitimized with the mantle of 
constitutionalization’. 23  A related concern is that an ‘impérialisme 
constitutionaliste’24 stifles the ordinary legal process.  
The indeterminacy of the idea of global constitutionalism may be 
detrimental on various levels. First, there is the danger that reliance on 
constitutionalism is actually counterproductive because it may postpone 
rather than encourage concrete debates on concrete problems, such as 
decision-making in the WTO, the composition of the UN Security Council, 
or how to liaise national parliaments to the UN.  
                                                        
21 N Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 1993) at 407-439. 
22 P Allott, ‘The Emerging International Aristocracy’ (2002) 35 New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 308 at 336. Allott continues: ‘The consoling Kantian myth that the 
republicanising of national constitutions will naturally produce a constitutionalising of international 
society, a patchwork cosmopolis, seems more improbable than ever. The U.N. Charter, an illusionary 
written constitution of international society, was and is merely the groundwork of an international 
oligarchy of oligarchies …’  
23 Cass (n 9) at 245 with regard to the debate on the constitutionalization of the WTO. 
24 Szurek (n 12) at 49 (para. 26). 
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Another aspect to the indeterminacy of the concept is its malleability in the 
service of all kinds of political projects. Actually, the term is currently also 
used by some American scholars with the intention of undermining the 
authority of international law as a whole. And finally: If all law is somehow 
‘constitutionalized’ and becomes more or less ‘constitutional’ or 
constitutionally infused, then nothing is constitutional. It would therefore 
not be helpful to make constitutionalism an absolute. Building on Wolfgang 
Friedman, it appears plausible that patterns of co-existence and co-operation 
persist even in a generally more constitutionalized world order. 
Eurocentrism?  
A seventh concern is culturalist. Current enthusiasm for world 
constitutionalism is strongest in Europe. The constitutionalist reading of 
international law may be too holistic and genuinely anti-pluralist. It may 
have a uni-civilizational bias built into it. The interests and distinctive 
cultural traditions of Third World Countries may be eroded by the evolution 
of such a system.25  
In response, we might point to the numerous constitutionalist stories that 
are currently being told within international legal scholarship; a single, 
uniform, consented constitutionalist approach does not exist. While 
constitutionalist thought has in historic terms been developed in Europe, it 
is a reaction to the universal experience of domination by humans over other 
humans. In 18th- and 19th-century Europe, constitutionalism was asserted 
against the dominant culture and the establishment.  
A ‘moderate’ constitutionalist reading in no way implies a uniform, coherent 
world constitution, and certainly does not imply the quest for a world state. 
The idea is not to create a global, centralized government, but to 
constitutionalize global (polyarchic and multi-level) governance. This project 
must indeed take more fully into account the dramatic situation in many 
developing countries.26  
It has moreover been argued that the idea of international constitutional law 
is hegemonic in the sense of representing personal interests as universal. 
However, the constitutionalist reconstruction of international law is 
primarily a scholarly suggestion. Academics can exercise at best indirect 
political hegemony, by influencing politicians. In order to exercise power in 
the academic discourse itself, one does not need the constitutionalist 
approach. 
A related concern about policy makes the point that if Europeans acquire 
disproportionate leverage on the workings of a more highly 
constitutionalized global system, the constitutional model of international 
                                                        
25 C Harlow, ‘Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values’ (2006) 17 
European Journal of International Law 187 at 189.  
26 A von Bogdandy, ‘Constitutionalism in International Law: Comment on a Proposal from 
Germany’ (2006) 47  Harvard International Law Journal 223 at 241 fn. 85. 
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law is unlikely to command American allegiance, especially if it is promoted 
as the paramount aspect of the global community.27  
However, reliance on cultural specificity often risks over-simplification. 
Even within the European academia of international law the constitutionalist 
approach is frequently criticized, notably by French and British scholars. 
This criticism is not automatically aligned with a ‘pro-US-American’ political 
attitude. The constitutionalist approach is directed against the disregard of 
the international rule of law. Even if, on average, European academics 
probably espouse a more ‘legalist’ position than average US-American ones, 
opposition between Europe and US-American academic discourse appears 
simplistic; important impulses towards global constitutionalism have come 
from US-American scholars such as Richard Falk, Thomas Franck, Fernando 
R. Tesòn, Anne-Marie Slaughter, or Joseph Nye.  
Anti-democratic juristocracy? 
Global constitutionalism is criticised by those whose conception of a healthy 
constitutional order at national level places a premium on common civil 
values and strong institutions directly accountable to the people. They ask 
for ‘democratic constitutionalism’, which is arguably lacking on the 
international plane.28  
However, this critique, although it may be formulated as a critique of global 
constitutionalism, is not in fact genuinely concerned with the 
constitutionalist reading of international law. The pertinent point is rather 
that global governance suffers from democratic deficits. Global 
constitutionalism seeks to unveil those deficits and suggests remedies. 
Furthermore, concern about a global juristocracy has been voiced. It is feared 
by some that unrepresentative international judges will be called upon to 
adjudicate disputes over the interpretation of a constitutional text. This 
concern reduplicates the traditional British objection to a written, ‘rigid’, 
constitution. However, international constitutional law will in the 
foreseeable future not be codified in a unified constitutional document. Most 
importantly, although the constitutional reading of international law does 
call for the strengthening of judicial review, the establishment of an 
international constitutional court with compulsory jurisdiction over 
constitutional matters is unlikely. An ‘imperfect’ international constitution, 
backed by punctual judicial control, would already constitute progress. And 
as long as international law enjoys only weak and indirect democratic 
legitimacy, the counter-majoritarian difficulty of constitutional review is 
lesser on the international plane than in the domestic legal order.  
 
                                                        
27 Cf. DM Johnston, ‘World Constitutionalism in the Theory of International Law’ in 
MacDonald and Johnston (n 8) at 20. 
28 Johnston (n 27) at 19. 
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3. The strengths of global constitutionalism 
A counter to uncontrolled deformalization  
A strength of the constitutionalist approach to international law may be that 
it might help to prevent uncontrolled deformalization of international law.29 
‘Deformalization’, as Martti Koskenniemi has called it, is the resort to some 
‘higher’ legitimacy arguments in opposition to and in violation of 
international legality, as e.g., in the Kosovo crisis.30  
Although constitutionalism is a value-loaded concept, it is nevertheless a 
legal approach in which consideration for the rule of law in a formal sense, 
for legal stability and for predictability plays a part, and which 
acknowledges that legality itself can engender a type of legitimacy.31 Seen in 
this light, constitutionalism is a juridical alternative to moralizing, tout court.  
Compensation for de-constitutionalization effected by 
globalization and global governance  
Second, the constitutionalist reconstruction of international law might be a 
reasonable strategy to compensate the de-constitutionalization on the 
domestic level which is effected by globalization and global governance.32 
Globalization puts the state and state constitutions under strain. Global 
problems compel states to co-operate within international organizations, and 
through bilateral and multilateral treaties. Previously typically 
governmental functions, such as guaranteeing human security, freedom and 
equality, are in part transferred on ‘higher’ levels. Moreover, non-state 
actors (acting within states or even in a transboundary fashion) are 
increasingly entrusted with the exercise of traditional state functions, even 
with core tasks such as military and police activity.33 All this has led to 
‘governance’ which is exercised beyond the states’ constitutional confines. 
                                                        
29 J Habermas, ‘Hat die Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts noch eine Chance?’ in idem, 
Der gespaltene Westen: Kleine politische Schriften (Frankfurt a M., Suhrkamp, 2004) 113 at 115. 
30 The Expert Commission with R Falk and others qualified the Kosovo-intervention as 
illegal, but legitimate (Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, 
International Response, Lessons Learned (New York, Oxford UP, 2000) at 185-198, esp. at 186). 
31 Cf. R von Ihering, Geist des römischen Rechts auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwicklung 
Part II, (5th edn, Leipzig, von Breitkopf und Härtel, 1898) at 471: ‘Die Form ist die geschworene 
Feindin der Willkür, die Zwillingsschwester der Freiheit. Denn die Form hält der Verlockung der 
Freiheit zur Zügellosigkeit das Gegengewicht, sie lenkt die Freiheitssubstanz in feste Bahnen, dass 
sie sich nicht zerstreue, verlaufe, sie kräftigt sie nach innen, schützt sie nach aussen. Feste Formen 
sind die Schule der Zucht und Ordnung und damit der Freiheit selber und eine Schutzwehr gegen 
äussere Angriffe – sie lassen sich nur brechen, nicht biegen’. 
32 See A Peters, ‘Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of 
Fundamental International Norms and Structures’ (2006) 19 Leiden Journal of International Law. 
33 In US-occupied Iraq of 2003/04, employees of federal contractors and sub-contractors 
(Blackwater USA, Kroll Inc., Custer Battles, the Titan corporation and others) worked as mercenaries, 
police, guards, prison officers and interrogators.  
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This means that state constitutions can no longer regulate the totality of 
governance in a comprehensive way. Thereby, the original claim of state 
constitutions to form a complete basic order is defeated. National 
constitutions are, so to speak, hollowed out; traditional constitutional 
principles become dysfunctional or empty. This affects not only the 
constitutional principle of democracy, but also the rule of law, the principle 
of social security, and the organisation of territory.34 In consequence, if we 
wish to preserve the basic principles of constitutionalism, we must ask for 
compensatory constitutionalization on the international plane. 
Critical potential 
Most importantly, the constitutionalist reading of the current international 
legal process appears to possess the potential for a healthy critical approach, 
and may provide for many issues a solid foundation for responsible 
practice.35 Because the idea of a constitution is associated with the quest for 
legitimacy in it, constitutionalist reconstruction provokes the pressing 
question of the legitimacy of global governance. The constitutionalist 
reading might even help to overcome statist expectations. It could clarify 
that legitimacy (however understood) of norms and of political rule does not 
depend on the structures of government or governance being exactly state-
like.36 In consequence, the constitutionalist reconstruction of international 
law may help rather than hinder the revelation of existing legitimacy 
deficiencies in this body of law, which can obviously no longer rely on state 
sovereignty and consent alone.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
34 A Peters, ‘The Globalisation of State Constitutions’ in A Nollkaemper (ed), The 
International-National Law Divide (2007 forthcoming).  
35 Bogdandy (n 26) at 242.  
36 M Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of 
Analysis’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 907 at 929.  
